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Abstract
The Maskin’s theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design.
In this paper, we will propose a self-enforcing agreement by which agents can fight
a bad social choice rule which satisfies monotonicity and no-veto if an additional
condition is satisfied. The agreement is based on complex numbers and is justified if
the designer receives messages from the agents through some communication chan-
nels (e.g., Internet). Under the assumption of complete information among agents,
the designer cannot prevent the agents from signing such agreement. Thereby, the
Maskin’s sufficiency theorem is amended.
Key words: Mechanism design; Nash implementation.
1 Introduction
Nash implementation is the cornerstone of the mechanism design theory. The
Maskin’s theorem provides an almost complete characterization of social choice
rules (SCRs) that are Nash implementable [1]. Because an SCR is specified
by a designer, a desired outcome from the designer’s perspective may not
be desirable for the agents. However, when the number of agents are at least
three, the designer can always implement an SCR which satisfies monotonicity
and no-veto in Nash equilibrium even if all agents dislike it (See Table 1 in
Section 3.1).
With the development of network economics, it is not unusual that the designer
receives messages from agents through some communication channel (e.g.,
Internet). For these cases, we will propose a self-enforcing agreement by which
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agents can fight a bad SCR when they face the Maskin’s mechanism, even
if the SCR satisfies monotonicity and no-veto. Put differently, the Maskin’s
sufficiency theorem will be amended for such cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminaries
of the mechanism design theory [2]; Section 3 is the main part of this paper,
where we will propose an agreement using complex numbers to amend the
sufficiency part of the Maskin’s theorem. Section 4 draws conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2, A = {a1, · · · , ak} be a
finite set of social outcomes. Let Ti be the finite set of agent i’s types, and the
private information possessed by agent i is denoted as ti ∈ Ti. We refer to a
profile of types t = (t1, · · · , tn) as a state. Let T = ∏i∈N Ti be the set of states.
At state t ∈ T , each agent i ∈ N is assumed to have a complete and transitive
preference relation ºti over the set A. We denote by ºt= (ºt1, · · · ,ºtn) the
profile of preferences in state t, and denote by Âti the strict preference part
of ºti. Fix a state t, we refer to the collection E =< N,A, (ºti)i∈N > as an
environment. Let ε be the class of possible environments. A social choice rule
(SCR) F is a mapping F : ε → 2A\{∅}. A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g)
describes a message or strategy set Mi for agent i, and an outcome function
g :
∏
i∈N Mi → A. Mi is unlimited except that if a mechanism is direct,
Mi = Ti.
An SCR F satisfies no-veto if, whenever a ºti b for all b ∈ A and for all
agents i but perhaps one j, then a ∈ F (E). An SCR F is monotonic if
for every pair of environments E and E ′, and for every a ∈ F (E), when-
ever a ºti b implies that a ºt′i b, there holds a ∈ F (E ′). We assume that
there is complete information among the agents, i.e., the true state t is com-
mon knowledge among them. Given a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) played in
state t, a Nash equilibrium of Γ in state t is a strategy profile m∗ such that:
∀i ∈ N, g(m∗(t)) ºti g(mi,m∗−i(t)),∀mi ∈ Mi. Let N (Γ, t) denote the set of
Nash equilibria of the game induced by Γ in state t, and g(N (Γ, t)) denote
the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes. An SCR F is Nash im-
plementable if there exists a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) such that for every
t ∈ T , g(N (Γ, t)) = F (t).
Maskin [1] provided an almost complete characterization of SCRs that were
Nash implementable. The main results of Ref. [1] are two theorems: 1) (Neces-
sity) If an SCR is Nash implementable, then it is monotonic. 2) (Sufficiency)
Let n ≥ 3, if an SCR is monotonic and satisfies no-veto, then it is Nash im-
plementable. In order to facilitate the following investigation, we briefly recall
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the Maskin’s mechanism published in Ref. [2] as follows:
Consider the following mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g), where agent i’s message
set is Mi = A × T × Z+, where Z+ is the set of non-negative integers. A
typical message sent by agent i is described as mi = (ai, ti, zi). The outcome
function g is defined in the following three rules: (1) If for every agent i ∈ N ,
mi = (a, t, 0) and a ∈ F (t), then g(m) = a. (2) If (n − 1) agents i 6= j send
mi = (a, t, 0) and a ∈ F (t), but agent j sends mj = (aj, tj, zj) 6= (a, t, 0),
then g(m) = a if aj Âtj a, and g(m) = aj otherwise. (3) In all other cases,
g(m) = a′, where a′ is the outcome chosen by the agent with the lowest index
among those who announce the highest integer.
3 An agreement to amend the Maskin’s sufficiency theorem
This section is the main part of this paper. In the beginning, we will show a
bad SCR which satisfies monotonicity and no-veto. It is Nash implementable
although all agents dislike it. Then, we will define some matrices and propose
an agreement with complex numbers, by which the agents can amend the
Maskin’s sufficiency theorem.
3.1 An example
Table 1: A bad SCR that is monotonic and satisfies no-veto.
State t1 State t2
Apple Lily Cindy Apple Lily Cindy
a3 a2 a1 a4 a3 a1
a1 a1 a3 a1 a1 a2
a2 a4 a2 a2 a2 a3
a4 a3 a4 a3 a4 a4
F (t1) = {a1} F (t2) = {a2}
Let N = {Apple, Lily, Cindy}, T = {t1, t2}, A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. In each
state t ∈ T , the preference relations (ºti)i∈N over the outcome set A and
the corresponding SCR F are given in Table 1. The SCR F is bad from the
viewpoint of the agents because in state t = t2, all agents unanimously prefer
a Pareto-efficient outcome a1 ∈ F (t1): for each agent i, a1 Ât2i a2 ∈ F (t2).
It seems that in state t = t2, (a1, t1, 0) should be a unanimous mi for each
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agent i. As a result, a1 may be generated by rule 1. However, Apple has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from (a1, t1, 0) to (a4, ∗, ∗), since a1 Ât1Apple a4,
a4 Ât2Apple a1; Lily also has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from (a1, t1, 0)
to (a3, ∗, ∗), since a1 Ât1Lily a3, a3 Ât2Lily a1.
Note that either Apple or Lily can certainly obtain her expected outcome
only if just one of them deviates from (a1, t1, 0) (If this case happened, rule
2 would be triggered). But this condition is unreasonable, because all agents
are rational, nobody is willing to give up and let the others benefit. Therefore,
both Apple and Lily will deviate from (a1, t1, 0). As a result, rule 3 will be
triggered. Since Apple and Lily both have a chance to win the integer game,
the winner is uncertain. Consequently, the final outcome is uncertain between
a3 and a4.
To sum up, although every agent prefers a1 to a2 in state t = t2, a1 cannot
be yielded in Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the Maskin’s mechanism makes the
Pareto-inefficient outcome a2 be implemented in Nash equilibrium in state
t = t2.
Can the agents find a way to let the Pareto-inefficient outcome a2 not be
Nash implemented in state t = t2 when they face the Maskin’s mechanism?
Interestingly, we will show that the answer may be “yes”. To do so, a new
weapon - the complex number - will be used. Although it has been well-known
for hundreds of years, it has never been used in the theory of mechanism design.
In what follows, first we will define some matrices, then we will propose an
agreement to break through the Maskin’s sufficiency theorem.
3.2 Definitions
Definition 1: Let Iˆ , σˆ be two 2× 2 matrices. −→C ,−→D are defined as two basic
vectors:
Iˆ ≡
1 0
0 1
 , σˆ ≡
0 1
1 0
 ,−→C ≡
1
0
 , −→D ≡
0
1
 . (1)
Hence, Iˆ
−→
C =
−→
C , Iˆ
−→
D =
−→
D ; σˆ
−→
C =
−→
D , σˆ
−→
D =
−→
C .
Definition 2: For n ≥ 3 agents, let each agent i ∈ N possess a basic vector.
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A vector is defined as the tensor product of n basic vectors:
−→
ψ 0 ≡ −→C ⊗n ≡ −→C ⊗ · · · ⊗ −→C︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
≡

1
0
· · ·
0

2n×1
(2)
The vector
−→
C ⊗n contains n basic vectors
−→
C and 2n elements.
−→
C ⊗n is also
denoted as
−−−−−−→
C · · ·CCn. Similarly,
−−−−−−→
C · · ·CDn ≡ −→C ⊗ · · · ⊗ −→C︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
⊗−→D =

0
1
· · ·
0

2n×1
(3)
Obviously, there are 2n possible vectors {−−−−−−→C · · ·CCn, · · · ,−−−−−−→D · · ·DDn}.
Definition 3: Jˆ ≡ 1√
2
(Iˆ⊗n + iσˆ⊗n), i.e.,
Jˆ ≡ 1√
2

1 i
· · · · · ·
1 i
i 1
· · · · · ·
i 1

2n×2n
, Jˆ+ ≡ 1√
2

1 −i
· · · · · ·
1 −i
−i 1
· · · · · ·
−i 1

2n×2n
(4)
where the symbol i denotes an imaginary number, and Jˆ+ is the conjugate
transpose of Jˆ . In what follows, we will not explicitly claim whether i is an
imaginary number or an index. It is easy for the reader to know its exact
meaning from the context.
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Definition 4:
−→
ψ 1 ≡ Jˆ−→ψ 0 = 1√
2

1
0
· · ·
0
i

2n×1
(5)
Definition 5: For θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2],
ωˆ(θ, φ) ≡
eiφ cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)
i sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
 . (6)
Ωˆ ≡ {ωˆ(θ, φ) : θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}. Hence, Iˆ = ωˆ(0, 0), σˆ = iωˆ(pi, 0). Let
Ωˆ0 = {Iˆ , σˆ}.
Definition 6: For j = 1, · · · , n, θj ∈ [0, pi], φj ∈ [0, pi/2], let ωˆj = ωˆ(θj, φj),
−→
ψ 2 ≡ [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]−→ψ 1. (7)
The dimension of ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn is 2n × 2n. Since only two elements in −→ψ 1 are
non-zero, it is not necessary to calculate the whole 2n × 2n matrix to yield−→
ψ 2. Indeed, we only need to calculate the leftmost and rightmost column of
[ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn] to derive −→ψ 2.
Definition 7:
−→
ψ 3 ≡ Jˆ+−→ψ 2.
Suppose
−→
ψ 3 = [η1, · · · , η2n ]T , let ∆ = [|η1|2, · · · , |η2n|2]. It can be easily
checked that Jˆ , ωˆj (j = 1, · · · , n) and Jˆ+ are all unitary matrices. Hence,
|−→ψ 3|2 = 1. Thus, ∆ can be viewed as a probability distribution, each element
of which represents the probability that we randomly choose a vector from the
set of all 2n possible vectors {−−−−−−→C · · ·CCn, · · · ,−−−−−−→D · · ·DDn}.
Definition 8: Condition λ contains five parts. The first three parts are defined
as follows:
λ1: Given an SCR F , there exist two states tˆ, t¯ ∈ T , tˆ 6= t¯ such that aˆ ºt¯i a¯ (for
each i ∈ N , aˆ ∈ F (tˆ), a¯ ∈ F (t¯)) with strict relation for some agent; and the
number of agents that encounter a preference change around aˆ in going from
state tˆ to t¯ is at least two. Denote by l the number of these agents. Without
loss of generality, let these l agents be the last l agents among n agents, i.e.,
agent (n− l + 1), · · · , n.
λ2: Consider the state t¯ specified in condition λ1, if there exists another tˆ
′ ∈ T ,
tˆ′ 6= tˆ that satisfies λ1, then aˆ ºt¯i aˆ′ (for each i ∈ N , aˆ ∈ F (tˆ), aˆ′ ∈ F (tˆ′)) with
6
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strict relation for some agent.
λ3: Consider the outcome aˆ specified in condition λ1, for any state t ∈ T , aˆ is
top ranked for each agent i among the first (n− l) agents.
3.3 An agreement that uses complex numbers
As we have seen, the Maskin’s mechanism is an abstract mechanism. Peo-
ple seldom consider how the designer actually receives messages from agents.
Roughly speaking, there are two manners: direct and indirect manner. In the
former manner, the agents report their messages to the designer directly (e.g.,
orally, by hand, etc); in the latter manner, the agents report messages to the
designer through some channels (e.g., Internet etc). In what follows, we assume
the agents communicate with the designer through some channel.
Definition 9: Suppose conditions λ1, λ2 and λ3 are satisfied, and the designer
uses the Maskin’s mechanism. An agreement ComplexMessage is constructed
by the agents (see Fig. 1). It is constructed after the designer claims the
outcome function g, and before agents send messages m = (m1, · · · ,mn) to
the designer. The algorithm MessageComputing is given in Definition 10.
Definition 10: The algorithm MessageComputing is defined as follows:
Input: (θi, φi, ai, ti, zi) ∈ [0, pi/2]× [0, pi]× A× T × Z+, i = 1, · · · , n.
Output: mi ∈ A× T × Z+, i = 1, · · · , n.
1: Reading (θi, φi) from each agent i ∈ N (See Fig. 2(a)).
2: Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn (See Fig.
2(b)).
3: Computing
−→
ψ 2 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]−→ψ 1, −→ψ 3 = Jˆ+−→ψ 2, and the probability
distribution ∆ (See Fig. 2(c)).
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4: Randomly choosing a vector from the set of all 2n possible vectors {−−−−−−→C · · ·CCn,
· · · ,−−−−−−→D · · ·DDn} according to the probability distribution ∆.
5: For each agent i ∈ N , let mi = (aˆ, tˆ, 0) (or mi = (ai, ti, zi)) if the i-th part
of the chosen vector is
−→
C (or
−→
D) (See Fig. 2(d)).
6: Sending m = (m1, · · · ,mn) to the designer through channels 1, · · · , n.
Initially, in ComplexMessage all agents transfer their channels to the com-
puter. After then, each agent j ∈ N can leave his channel to the computer, or
take back his channel and communicate with the designer directly:
1) Whenever any agent takes back his channel, every other agent will detect
this deviation and take back their channels too, henceforth all agents will com-
municate with the designer directly.
2) When all agents leave their channels to the computer, the algorithm Mes-
sageComputing works, i.e., calculates m = (m1, · · · ,mn) and sends it to the
designer.
Put differently, after ComplexMessage is constructed, each agent j ∈ N inde-
pendently faces two options:
• S(j, 0): leave his channel to the computer, and submit (θj, φj, aj, tj, zj) to
the algorithm MessageComputing.
• S(j, 1): take back his channel, and submit (aj, tj, zj) to the designer directly.
Remark 1: Although the time and space complexity of MessageComputing
are exponential, i.e., O(2n), it works well when the number of agents is not
large. For example, the runtime of MessageComputing is about 0.5s for 15
agents, and about 12s for 20 agents (MATLAB 7.1, CPU: Intel (R) 2GHz,
RAM: 3GB).
Remark 2: The problem of Nash implementation requires complete informa-
tion among all agents. In the last paragraph of Page 392 [2], Serrano wrote:
“We assume that there is complete information among the agents... This as-
sumption is especially justified when the implementation problem concerns a
small number of agents that hold good information about one another”. Hence,
the fact thatMessageComputing is suitable for small-scale cases (e.g., less than
20 agents) is acceptable for Nash implementation.
Definition 11: Consider the state t¯ specified in condition λ1. Suppose λ1 and
λ2 are satisfied, and m = (m1, · · · ,mm) is computed by MessageComputing.
$C···CC , $C···CD, $D···DC and $D···DD are defined as the payoffs to the n-th agent
in state t¯ when the chosen vector in Step 4 ofMessageComputing is
−−−−−−→
C · · ·CCn,−−−−−−→
C · · ·CDn, −−−−−−→D · · ·DCn or −−−−−−→D · · ·DDn respectively.
Note: When an agent faces a certain outcome, his payoff is the utility that
he exactly obtains; when an agent faces an uncertain outcome among a set of
outcomes, his payoff is the ex-ante utility before the final outcome is realized.
It should be emphasized that the word “uncertain” is different from “random”:
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the latter means there is a certain probability distribution, whereas the former
means the outcome is totally unknown before it is realized.
Definition 12: Suppose conditions λ1 and λ2 are satisfied. When the true
state is t¯, consider each message mi = (ai, ti, zi), where ai is top-ranked for
each agent i. The rest parts of condition λ are defined as:
λ4: $C···CC > $D···DD.
λ5: $C···CC > $C···CD cos2(pi/l) + $D···DC sin2(pi/l).
3.4 Main result
Proposition 1: For n ≥ 3, suppose the agents communicate with the designer
through channels. Consider an SCR F that satisfies monotonicity and no-
veto. Suppose the designer uses the Maskin’s mechanism Γ and condition λ
is satisfied, then in state t¯ the agents can sign a self-enforcing agreement to
make the Pareto-inefficient outcome F (t¯) not be yielded in Nash equilibrium.
Proof : Since λ1 and λ2 are satisfied, then there exist two states tˆ, t¯ ∈ T ,
tˆ 6= t¯ such that aˆ ºt¯i a¯ (for each i ∈ N , aˆ ∈ F (tˆ), a¯ ∈ F (t¯)) with strict relation
for some agent; and the number of agents that encounter a preference change
around aˆ in going from state tˆ to t¯ is at least two. Suppose the true state is
t¯. Let us check whether the agents can make the Pareto-inefficient outcome a¯
not be implemented in Nash equilibrium by constructing ComplexMessage.
Firstly, note that after the agents construct ComplexMessage, the designer
cannot discriminate whether a received message mi is reported directly from
agent i or sent by MessageComputing. Put differently, the timing steps of the
designer are not changed:
Time 1: The designer claims the outcome function g to all agents;
Time 2: The designer receives m = (m1, · · · ,mn);
Time 3: The designer computes the outcome g(m).
Secondly, from the viewpoints of agents, the situation is changed. After con-
structing ComplexMessage, there are two possible cases:
1) Suppose every agent i chooses S(i, 0), then the algorithm MessageCom-
puting works. Consider the strategy profile chosen by the agents: each agent
i = 1, · · · , (n − l) submits (θi, φi) = (0, 0); each agent i = (n − l + 1), · · · , n
submits (θi, φi) = (0, pi/l). Since condition λ is satisfied, according to Lemma
1 (see Appendix), this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of Γ in state t¯. As
a result, in Step 4 of MessageComputing, the chosen vector will be
−−−−−−→
C · · ·CC;
in Step 5 of MessageComputing, mi = (aˆ, tˆ, 0) for each i ∈ N . In the end,
g(m) = aˆ /∈ F (t¯). Each agent i’s payoff is $C···CC .
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2) Suppose some agent i ∈ N chooses S(i, 1), i.e., take back his channel and
report mi to the designer directly. Then all of the rest agents will take back
their channels and report messages to the designer directly. Each agent i’s
payoff is $D···DD.
Since condition λ4 is satisfied, it is not profitable for any agent i to unilaterally
take back his channel. According to Telser [3], ComplexMessage is a self-
enforcing agreement among the agents. Put differently, although the agents
collaborate to construct ComplexMessage between Time 1 and 2, they do not
require a third-party to enforce ComplexMessage.
To sum up, in state t¯, the agents can sign a self-enforcing agreement Com-
plexMessage to make the Pareto-inefficient outcome a¯ not be implemented in
Nash equilibrium. ¤
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a self-enforcing agreement to help agents avoid the
Pareto-inefficient outcome when they face a bad social choice rule. When the
designer uses the Maskin’s mechanism and receives messages from the agents
through some communication channels (e.g., Internet), the designer cannot
restrict the agents from signing such agreement. It should be noted that the
introduction of complex numbers plays an important role in this paper. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no similar work before. Since the Maskin’s
mechanism has been widely applied to many disciplines, there are many works
to do in the future to generalize the self-enforcing agreement further.
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Appendix
Lemma 1: Suppose the algorithm MessageComputing works. If condition λ
is satisfied, consider the following strategy:
1) Each agent i = 1, · · · , (n− l) submits (θi, φi) = (0, 0);
2) Each agent i = (n− l + 1), · · · , (n− 1) submits (θi, φi) = (0, pi/l);
then the optimal value of (θ, φ) for the n-th agent is (0, pi/l).
Proof : Since condition λ1 is satisfied, then l ≥ 2. Let
Cˆl ≡ ωˆ(0, pi/l) =
eipil 0
0 e−i
pi
l

2×2
, thus, Cˆl ⊗ Cˆl =

ei
2pi
l
1
1
e−i
2pi
l

22×22
,
Cˆl ⊗ · · · ⊗ Cˆl︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−1
=

ei
(l−1)
l
pi
∗
· · ·
e−i
(l−1)
l
pi

2l−1×2l−1
.
Here we only explicitly list the up-left and bottom-right entries because only
these two entries are useful in the following discussions. The other entries in
diagonal are simply represented as symbol ∗. Note that
Iˆ ⊗ · · · ⊗ Iˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−l
=

1
1
· · ·
1

2n−l×2n−l
,
thus,
Iˆ ⊗ · · · ⊗ Iˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−l
⊗ Cˆl ⊗ · · · ⊗ Cˆl︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−1
=

ei
(l−1)
l
pi
∗
· · ·
e−i
(l−1)
l
pi

2n−1×2n−1
.
Suppose the n-th agent chooses arbitrary parameters (θ, φ) in his strategy
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(θ, φ, an, tn, zn), let
ωˆ(θ, φ) =
eiφ cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)
i sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
 ,
then,
Iˆ ⊗ · · · ⊗ Iˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−l
⊗ Cˆl ⊗ · · · ⊗ Cˆl︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−1
⊗ωˆ(θ, φ)
=

ei[
(l−1)pi
l
+φ] cos(θ/2) ∗
iei
(l−1)pi
l sin(θ/2) ∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
· · ·
∗ ie−i (l−1)pil sin(θ/2)
∗ e−i[ (l−1)pil +φ] cos(θ/2)

2n×2n
.
Recall that
−→
ψ 1 =
1√
2

1
0
· · ·
0
i

2n×1
,
thus,
−→
ψ 2 = [Iˆ ⊗ · · · ⊗ Iˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−l
⊗ Cˆl ⊗ · · · ⊗ Cˆl︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−1
⊗ωˆ(θ, φ)]−→ψ 1 = 1√
2

ei[
(l−1)pi
l
+φ] cos(θ/2)
iei
(l−1)pi
l sin(θ/2)
0
· · ·
0
−e−i (l−1)pil sin(θ/2)
ie−i[
(l−1)pi
l
+φ] cos(θ/2)

2n×1
,
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−→
ψ 3 = Jˆ
+−→ψ 2 = 1
2

ei[
(l−1)pi
l
+φ] cos(θ/2) + e−i[
(l−1)pi
l
+φ] cos(θ/2)
iei
(l−1)pi
l sin(θ/2) + ie−i
(l−1)pi
l sin(θ/2)
0
· · ·
0
ei
(l−1)pi
l sin(θ/2)− e−i (l−1)pil sin(θ/2)
−iei[ (l−1)pil +φ] cos(θ/2) + ie−i[ (l−1)pil +φ] cos(θ/2)

2n×1
=

cos(θ/2) cos( l−1
l
pi + φ)
i sin(θ/2) cos l−1
l
pi
0
· · ·
0
i sin(θ/2) sin l−1
l
pi
cos(θ/2) sin( l−1
l
pi + φ)

2n×1
.
The probability distribution ∆ is computed from
−→
ψ 3:
PC···CC = cos2(θ/2) cos2(φ− pi
l
) (8)
PC···CD = sin2(θ/2) cos2
pi
l
(9)
PD···DC = sin2(θ/2) sin2
pi
l
(10)
PD···DD = cos2(θ/2) sin2(φ− pi
l
) (11)
Obviously,
PC···CC + PC···CD + PD···DC + PD···DD = 1.
Consider the payoff to the n-th agent,
$n = $C···CCPC···CC + $C···CDPC···CD + $D···DCPD···DC + $D···DDPD···DD. (12)
Since λ4 is satisfied, i.e., $C···CC > $D···DD, then the n-th agent chooses φ = pi/l
to minimize sin2(φ− pi
l
). As a result, PC···CC = cos2(θ/2).
Since λ5 is satisfied, i.e., $C···CC > $C···CD cos2(pi/l) + $D···DC sin2(pi/l), then
the n-th agent prefers θ = 0, which leads $n to its maximum $C···CC . Therefore,
the optimal value of (θ, φ) for the n-th agent is (0, pi/l). ¤
Note: The proof of Lemma 1 is similar to the derivation of Eq. (25) [4].
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% A Matlab program of the algorithm 
start_time = cputime
% n: the number of agents. In Table 1, there are 3 agents: Apple, Lily, Cindy
n = 3;
% Defining the array of     and                      .
theta = zeros(n,1);
phi = zeros(n,1);
% Reading Apple’s parameters. For example,
theta(1) = 0;
phi(1) = pi/2;
% Reading Lily’s parameters. For example, 
theta(2) = 0;
phi(2) = pi/2;
% Reading Cindy’s parameters. For example, 
theta(3) = 0;
phi(3) = 0;
)2/,0(ˆˆˆ1 piωωω == Apple
iθ nii ,,1, L=φ
Fig. 2 (a). Reading each agent i s parameters     and                     .iθ nii ,,1, L=φ
)2/,0(ˆˆˆ 2 piωωω == Lily
)0,0(ˆˆˆ3 ωωω == Cindy
Fig. 2 (b). Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of
% Defining two 2*2 matrices
A=zeros(2,2);
B=zeros(2,2);
% In the beginning, A represents 
A(1,1)=exp(i*phi(1))*cos(theta(1)/2);
A(1,2)=i*sin(theta(1)/2);
A(2,1)=A(1,2);
A(2,2)=exp(-i*phi(1))*cos(theta(1)/2);
row_A=2;
% Computing 
for agent = 2 : n
% B varies from to
B(1,1) = exp(i*phi(agent))*cos(theta(agent)/2);
B(1,2) = i*sin(theta(agent)/2);
B(2,1) = B(1,2);
B(2,2) = exp(-i*phi(agent))*cos(theta(agent)/2);
% Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of C= A ⊗ B
C = zeros(row_A*2, 2);
for row=1 : row_A
C((row-1)*2+1, 1) = A(row,1) * B(1,1);
C((row-1)*2+2, 1) = A(row,1) * B(2,1);
C((row-1)*2+1, 2) = A(row,2) * B(1,2);
C((row-1)*2+2, 2) = A(row,2) * B(2,2);
end
A=C;
row_A = 2 * row_A;
end
% Now the matrix A contains the leftmost and rightmost columns of
1ωˆ
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
2ωˆ nωˆ
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
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Fig. 2 (c). Computing     
% Computing 
psi2 = zeros(power(2,n),1);
for row=1 : power(2,n)
psi2(row) = (A(row,1) + A(row,2)*i) / sqrt(2);
end
% Computing 
psi3 = zeros(power(2,n),1);
for row=1 : power(2,n)
psi3(row) = (psi2(row) - i*psi2(power(2,n)-row+1)) / sqrt(2);
end
% Computing the probability distribution
distribution = psi3.*conj(psi3);
23
ˆ ψψ rr += J
012
ˆ]ˆˆ[ ψωωψ rLr J
n
⊗⊗=
∆
∆,, 32 ψψ
rr
% Randomly choosing a vector according to the probability distribution
random_number = rand;
temp = 0;
for index=1: power(2,n)
temp = temp + distribution(index);
if temp >= random_number
break;
end
end
% indexstr: a binary representation of the index of the chosen vector
%   ‘0’ stands for      , ‘1’ stands for  
index_str = dec2bin(index-1);
sizeofindexstr = size(index_str);
% Defining an array of messages for all agents
m = cell(n,1);
% For each agent          , the algorithm generates the message
for index = 1 : n - sizeofindexstr(2)
m{index,1} = strcat('s(',int2str(index),'): ');
end
for index = 1 : sizeofindexstr(2)
    if index_str(index)=='0'       % Note: ‘0’ stands for  
m{n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index,1} = strcat('s(',int2str(n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index),'): ');
else
m{n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index,1} = strcat('s(',int2str(n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index),'):3rd , 4th ,5th parameters');
end
end
% The algorithm sends messages                  to the designer
for index = 1 : n
disp(m(index));
end
end_time = cputime;
runtime=end_time – start_time
∆
i
mNi∈
n
mm ,,1 L
Fig. 2 (d). Computing all messages    
n
mm ,,1 L
C
r
C
r
D
r
0,ˆ,ˆ ta
0,ˆ,ˆ ta
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